The (reputation for) competence of a central bank at doing its job makes monetary policy under discretion credible and transparent. Based on its reading of the state of the economy, the central bank announces its policy intentions to the public in a cheap-talk game. The precision of its private signal measures its competence. The fineness of the equilibrium message space measures its credibility and transparency. This is increasing in the competence/inflation bias ratio: the public expects a competent central bank to use its discretion more to pursue its "objective" targets than to surprise expectations and stimulate output. 
effects. The first is the power of the words that CB trades off against its inflation bias. Formally, CB's bias/competence ratio constrains the equilibrium message space. The more precise is CB's information about the state of the economy, the more weight it puts on doing something about it, relative to surprising P's expectations; the more weight (relative to prior beliefs) P puts on CB's announcement in forming these expectations, the less CB needs to lie to surprise expectations and to stimulate output, and the more credible its announcements. The second effect is the credibility of likely announcements. A more competent CB is relatively less likely to observe and to announce the need for extreme monetary policy measures. Thus, it is less credible in the rare instances when extreme measures are in fact called for, but more credible in fine-tuning the frequent small deviations of the inflation target from its long-run mean.
We present an algorithm to compute all equilibria of the communication game, and we provide some numerical examples with realistic parameter values. Technically, Crawford and Sobel's (1982) algorithm does not apply because they confine their analysis to a bounded set of states of nature, while we rely on Gaussian distributions to obtain a natural parameterization of competence. Nonetheless, in our unbounded Gaussian model, also, the equilibrium message space is always finite.
Finally, we address some extensions. Alternative sources of uncertainty yield the same result and intuition. Repeated play of the same game generates a larger equilibrium set. We study sequential equilibria supported by grim trigger: if CB ever lies, P never heeds its announcements again. We show that a sufficiently competent, patient, and unbiased CB can sustain truth-telling in equilibrium. In this sense, competence still implies credibility. Otherwise, as in the static case, equilibria still take the form of a partition that can be constructed from a known algorithm.
This discussion adds a new dimension to the endless debate on rules versus discretion in monetary policy. The world is too complex to be dealt with by a single rule. Commitment to a rule has a cost in terms of flexibility in addressing each new situation with an appropriate response. This loss of flexibility is behind Svensson's (2003) stance against the adoption of Taylor-like instrument rules, and in favor of explicit targets. But a more competent CB knows better how to use the freedom afforded by discretion. Thus it has a stronger incentive, and a more credible reason in P's eyes, to reject binding rules. The beneficial effect of CB's competence on flexibility adds to that on transparency, to work against any kind of commitment, and in favor of case-by-case evaluation, followed by a transparent explanation to P of the outcome of the analysis of the state of the economy. Indeed, the Greenspan Fed never adopted any explicit rule.
This principle applies to other monetary policy biases, such as the "stabilization bias" (Richard Clarida, Jordi Gall, and Mark Gertler 1999), and reasons to hide information, such as the "CNBC effect" of monetary policy announcements (Stephen Morris and Hyun Shin 2002), as well as to all kinds of public announcements by policymakers, such as electoral campaign promises. Often, and justifiably so, public opinion discounts policy statementssuch as claims on the effects of a proposed tax cut-as possibly motivated by some kind of political (preference) bias. At the same time, people heed such announcements more if they consider their sender authoritative and competent on the issues. Competence of the messagesender enhances the scope for successful communication and coordination, not only because more accurate information is more valuable to its receiver, but also because it soothes the receiver's concerns about the hidden motives behind the sender's message. Indeed, the basic result and intuition likely extend to all communication games where the sender has conflicting objectives that are smooth in actions and states of nature.
Section I reviews the relevant literature, Section II presents the model, Section III characterizes equilibrium communication, Section IV presents the key comparative statics, Section V illustrates some numerical examples, Section VI demonstrates some extensions, and Section VII concludes.
I. Related Literature
The relevance of CB's private information and the consequent signaling role of monetary policy are the subject of an ongoing debate (see Alex Cukierman 1995) . Christina Romer and David Romer (2000) present evidence that the Fed's inflation forecasts contain valuable private information, relative to commercial forecasts. In contrast, Blinder (1998) and others argue that the Fed knows privately only its own intentions, because the relevant economic data are publicly and readily available. One may reply that research departments afford CBs a superior ability to process the available data. In our model, this issue is moot: a CB's private information can be interpreted as its own subjective view of the macroeconomic outlook, a view that plays a purely strategic role. We assume that P is interested only in correctly anticipating CB's moves, and does not care about the state of the economy per se. Credible communication develops as long as CB believes that its own opinion is informative about economic fundamentals and that P does agree on this, even if, in fact, P does not. Canzoneri (1985) argues that the standard solutions to time inconsistency are inadequate when CB has private information on a state of the economy. He extends in this direction a static monetary policy game a la Barro and Gordon (1983) . The timing of events makes cheap talk communication redundant: the inflation/output trade-off originates from a wagecontracting model, where P sets nominal wages before CB observes the state and chooses its policy. But, if the game were repeated, any serial correlation in the state of the economy would create a scope for communication. To keep the analysis of communication tractable, we obtain the same effect by changing the timing of events in the static game.3 Later, we address the repeated game.
Our approach to cheap talk communication follows Crawford and Sobel's (1982) classic model of partisan advice, and the vast literature generated by this seminal contribution. In their model, a sender observes without noise a state of nature and announces a message to a receiver. The two agents have genuinely incongruent preferences over the state and the receiver's action. In our model, the receiver (P) cares only about the sender's (CB) final action (monetary policy),4 not about the state of nature that CB observes with noise, and CB has an inflation bias, measuring the degree of time inconsistency. Jeremy Stein (1989) shows, in a different monetary policy game, that time inconsistency induces the sender to lie, just like a genuine preference bias. Our contribution is to identify the beneficial effects of competence on credibility.
The literature on cheap talk advice has not explored the comparative statics effects of changing the sender's competence, formally equivalent to changing the distribution of states of nature, on equilibrium communication." The one exception is Marco Ottaviani (2000) . In his model, the sender can observe a uniformly distributed state with a precision that she may choose covertly; so the issue is moral hazard, as opposed to our "adverse selection-reputational" view of precision as competence. The sender just speaks, and the receiver cares only about the objective informational content of the message, in the style of Crawford and Sobel (1982) . So, there is no "credibility" in the usual time-inconsistency sense, because there are no deeds (sender's final action) to match to words (message). In contrast, in Roland B6nabou and Guy Laroque (1992), the message sender is an insider trader who has only one (biased) objective, to make money out of other traders, but has valuable private information about the fundamental value of the asset. In their Proposition 5 they show that the fewer the noise traders, who do not incorporate information into their decisions, the more "powerful" is the insider's announcements, the stronger his temptation to lie, of the economy, but also coordinate the beliefs and actions of private agents, who then place too much weight on CB's policy/announcements. The social marginal benefit of CB's competence is initially negative, because a modest increase in the accuracy of CB's information about fundamentals amplifies the undesirable coordination. Similarly, in our model competence is the power of CB's words in P's expectations. P weighs these words against its prior beliefs on the state of nature, because it has no private information of its own. Therefore, competence is always beneficial, because it works against time inconsistency, the impediment to communication.
II. The Model
Our two players are a central bank (CB) and the private sector (P). The economy is described by an output-gap version of the natural-rate Phillips curve:
where y is the growth rate of real output (or of minus the output gap), w7 is the rate of inflation, x is P's rational expectation of inflation conditional on its information set Dp, where b is desired output growth rate, 7r* is the average level of desired inflation, w is a shock to desired inflation, A > 0 is the relative weight on inflation, and the expectation is conditioned on CB's information 0cB. P has possibly a different information set, and its action is to formulate the expectation of inflation x and to set some nominal prices (e.g., wages) accordingly.6
When all parameters and shock realizations are public information, as is well known, this game has a unique Nash equilibrium outcome with y = 0 and The timing of the game is as follows:
1. CB observes 0 and announces to P a message A (silence is a message); 2. P formulates rational expectations of inflation x conditional on A; 3. CB chooses the optimal inflation rate 7n'(0, A), which depends on both its private information 0 and its announcement A. When CB cannot commit, it has an incentive to surprise expectations. As we will see shortly, the "optimal surprise" (best response to expectations x) is It is immaterial whether P believes 0 to be genuinely informative of the state of the economy t, or 0 just represents CB's own view of the economy, which might be totally uninformative about o from P's viewpoint. The role of 0 for P is purely strategic; P cares about what CB believes, even if P has no confidence whatsoever in CB's competence, because P is concerned only with anticipating CB's moves. Of course, CB has to believe that P believes 0 to be informative, even if P really does not. This is another difference from Morris and Shin (2002) , where public announcements play both an allocative role, and a signaling role of genuinely valuable information about fundamentals. CB wants to surprise expectations by inflating the economy. Thus, CB faces a dilemma. On the one hand, it wants to do "the right thing," by setting policy to a level 7rC(O) appropriate to the perceived state of the economy HO, and make sure that expectations are coordinated accordingly. On the other hand, it wants to induce low expectations to surprise them with high inflation and stimulate output. The higher competence H, the more weight CB puts on its view of what the economy needs and the less on surprising expectations. In the following sections, we develop this analysis formally.
III. Communication and Transparency of Monetary Policy
In this section we characterize the set of equilibria of the communication game. Without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to messages that are subsets of the real line such that announcing the set A means saying that 0 E A. A Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium with Communication (PBEC) is a measurable partition 6A of R and a set of beliefs about 0 with the following properties. For all A E 4, if CB announces A to P, P "believes" it, namely P updates its beliefs about 0 in a Bayesian fashion from the prior X(0, 1/H) to a posterior Pr(0j0 E A). If CB makes any other announcement not in 4, P assimilates it to some message A' E A.
After announcing A, CB chooses the optimal inflation rate rr. Anticipating the consequences of any announcement, a CB that privately observes 0 E A has no incentives to send any other message than A.
When 64 = R, no communication takes place: there always exists a fully nonrevealing equilibrium, equivalent to "babbling," where P believes nothing that CB says. When every A E -A is a singleton, we have full communication, or truth-telling.
A. Equilibrium for a Given Policy Announcement
We find equilibria of this game by backward induction. First, for every CB's private observation 0 ("type"), we fix the announcement A and find the equilibrium inflation rate in(0, A) of the policy subgame. Second, we find the equilibrium announcement.
In any PBEC, after CB announces a message A, P "believes it." Formally, P reformulates an expectation of inflation The intuition behind these incentives constraints is simple. CB would like P to expect low inflation and to surprise P to boost growth closer to the bliss rate b. Thus, when observing 0, CB prefers not to tell a lie 0' (another message that P would believe, as part of the equilibrium partition) only if this lie 0' is so far from 0 relative to the candidate equilibrium announcement 0 that saying 0' and being believed will excessively mislead inflation expectations, and weigh on the inflation term of the social loss function.
C. Equilibrium Characterization
We now assume that a PBEC exists, and we illustrate some of its properties. In the next subsection we will tackle existence. First, we confirm a well-known fact. 
PROOF:
Under truth-telling, CB reveals its type 0 credibly, so P believes any pointwise announcement, i.e., 0 can be any real number. But then for 0 = 0, the first line in (9) To satisfy all Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraints, it suffices to impose that each boundary type CB's 0k be indifferent between the message Ok> 0k, that it and its right-neighbors 0k + e for some e > 0 are supposed to send, and the message Ok-_ < 0k, that its leftneighbors 0k -e are supposed to send. Be-cause, then, from (9), all 0 > Ok strictly prefer 0k to Ok -, so their IC constraint is satisfied when comparing their equilibrium message Ok to the largest smaller message Ok-1, and a fortiori to all smaller messages Ok-1-j. At the same time, again from (9), all 0 < Ok strictly prefer Ok-1 to Ok, so their IC constraint is satisfied when comparing their equilibrium_message Ok_ 1 to the smallest larger message Ok, and a fortiori to all larger messages Ok +j. When this holds for all k, all IC constraints are automatically satisfied, strictly so for 0 in the interior of each interval, and weakly so for boundary types.
From (9), the required indifference condition for the boundary type f_k+ 1 between the two nearby messages Ok and Ok + can be written as follows: From (11), the critical parameter q, the normalized bias/competence ratio, bounds the fineness of the equilibrium message space. First, suppose that CB observes 0 and in equilibrium announces Ok > 0. For every lower message Ok-1 < Ok that is part of the equilibrium, we deduce from (11):
Rearranging, messages have to be at least q apart: Ok -Ok-1 > q. Using this inequality one step forward (at k + 1),_(11) again yields q < Ok+ -Ok = 2(0k+I -Ok) -q, which implies the sharper restriction
The upper bound of each interval must be at least q larger than the mean of 0 on that interval. Since Ok < Ok, this also implies that intervals must have a width of at least q: where { Ok} ik is a strictly increasing and finite sequence satisfying (10) and (11).
PROOF: See Appendix.
D. Two-Message Equilibrium
Having characterized any equilibrium of the communication game, we now explore its existence. First, we show that a two-message equilibrium always exists, so CB is always able to credibly communicate something. This stands in contrast to Crawford and Sobel's (1982) results, where the bias b has to be small enough for communication to occur, due to their assumption of a bounded state space.
In a two-message equilibrium, a CB observing 0 < 01 for some real number 01 announces 00 > q. Since 02) > 0 and the normal distribution of 0 is symmetric around its mean zero, it follows that 2 < 102)i.e.,2) is closer to zero than 12). When CB announces that low inflation is needed, P believes this but sets a relatively high expectation 7r* + HHO2), below but not far from 7r*. When CB says that high inflation is needed, P's expectation goes way above 7r*, to 7r* + HO.2). Preference bias skews credible communication. The higher q, the higher and the more asymmetric are the two equilibrium messages.
Since 0I2) > 0, Pr(60)) = Pr(0 -802)) > 1/2. That is, somewhat paradoxically, CB is ex ante more likely to credibly announce that low inflation (7r* + H0o2) < 7r*) is appropriate, even if the ex ante chance of high and low inflation is even. CB may even credibly announce belowaverage inflation (* H (2) when some moderately above-average inflation is truly required by 0 E (0, 0(2)). So an inflation-biased CB is relatively likely to speak like a conservative one-and get away with it! Credibility forces CB to be conservative in its announcements. The alternative two-message equilibrium, with S2) very low and negative and 2 moderately high and positive, would not be feasible, because the temptation to say ax2) and be believed would be very strong. The more competent CB is, the less conservative it can be.
E. Equilibrium Existence and Construction
Our equilibrium characterization suggests a recursive algorithm to construct any equilibrium. Finding the equilibrium with two messages is a trivial nonlinear equation problem in one variable, the cutoff 02). Any equilibrium with more than two messages is a finite sequence solving a second-order difference equation, but whose initial value is unknown and whose final value must satisfy a known restriction. Finding this sequence requires a "shooting" method. This algorithm can be used to find all equilibria of the game for a given set of parameters q, H. Because the parameter space is bidimensional, the search is cumbersome. To make it a simple unidimensional search, we study communication in a different space. Suppose that CB, having observed 0, announces a message about the magnitude C-H 8 -HCH* N(0, H-1) = -N0, 1).
Clearly, the exact form of communication is not important, and the equilibrium partition in this space is dictated by {\/H O}-i, as we are "changing language." In particular, given parameter values, the set of equilibria is the same, up to the rescaling.
Under this renormalization, the "composite" normalized bias is 2b(s2 + A) (13) q = q = Hs Just like q in (7), q is decreasing in competence H and conservatism A and increasing in inflation bias b and in nominal rigidity s for s-\. The distribution of the message is a standard normal, invariant to changes in competence and in any other parameter. Therefore, we have collapsed all the parameters of the model into the renormalized bias q, and we can solve numerically for the entire set of equilibria when q ranges over the positive reals, stopping when q is so large that only two-message equilibria remain. This clearly provides a complete characterization of the equilibrium set, and we can prove general result numerically.8 After this rescaling, we implement the algorithm described earlier in a simple GAUSS program. First, we find that there cannot be a threemessage equilibrium whenever q > 0.37. Given the properties of the function 0 established earlier, for any q > 0.37, only the two-message equilibrium exists (it always does). Therefore our characterization of the comparative statics effects of changes in parameters is complete when iterating over values of q in a bounded set [0, 0.37].
We obtain, and illustrate later numerically, the following characterization. For every set of parameter values, there exists a maximum number of messages (at least two) that can be supported in a PBEC, and there exists a PBEC with every integer number of messages up to that upper bound. We state the results in terms of the original message space. 
IV. Competence Implies Credibility
The central result of this paper is the comparative statics effect of competence H on the structure of the equilibrium. The competence of the informed party, CB, has a beneficial effect on its ability to communicate information to P. Notice that, in the original message space where CB announces its private signal 0, competence H formally plays two roles: it reduces the normalized bias q, and it determines the probability distribution of the private signal 0 -~ (0, H-1), thus the function h(" 1H) defined earlier to construct the equilibrium message space.
The first strategic effect of competence is the power of the words. Competence H is the weight that P puts on CB's credible announcement 0 in forming an expectation of inflation. In fact, inflation expectations x(A) contain a term HO which is just P's expectation, conditional on the announcement 0 of CB's updated inflation target HO: namely, from (4), If P knows that CB deems its own information 0 to be accurate, then P also knows that CB will put a large H weight on the private signal 0, relative to the weight 1 -H that CB puts on the prior expectation of w, normalized to 0. The reason for this strategic effect is simple. In CB's best response (the monetary policy function (3)), competence H affects the weight that CB puts on its own private information, as opposed to inflation expectations and to its inflation preferences ATr* + sb. Since P cares only about anticipating CB's moves, when formulating the expectation of HO, P will use the same value of H as CB. Knowing that P adopts the competence weight H, CB knows that P's inflation forecast error 7 -x and the resulting output gap y depend on H(0 -0). The larger is H, the smaller the "lie" (0 -0) that CB needs to tell to align the output gap to the desired rate b. At the same time, CB must choose inflation as close to + HO as possible to respond to the economy's needs. So the larger is CB's competence H, the smaller CB's incentives to claim a very different 0 than the one it truly observed, and the finer the communication structure that P trusts. The interplay between the two conflicting objectives, output (which requires an inflation surprise) and inflation (which requires an appropriate inflation rate), generates this effect. Setting the right inflation rate for the state of the economy and surprising P optimally is impossible because P has a prior it relies upon, so CB must trade off the two. The more competent CB is, the more weight it puts on the first objective, and the more P can believe CB.
If CB had just one biased objective, as in Crawford and Sobel's (1982) original game, then this effect would disappear. This occurs when A = 0, so CB's objective is just L(y, ir) = E[(yb)2IUcB]. Then, in (3), CB puts no weight on its own private information (the weight on 0 is AMH). Therefore, a change in competence has no effect on CB's actions, and P has no more nor fewer reasons to believe what a more competent CB says. It is easy to show that as A \ 0, the normalized bias q explodes, the equilibrium message partition changes smoothly, and the effect of competence on credibility disappears continuously, with no discontinuity at A = 0. In fact, for a sufficiently small but positive A, just like for a sufficiently small but positive H, the normalized bias q is so high that the only nontrivial equilibrium has two messages. As A declines further and approaches zero, the expected value of communication with two messages declines (the unique cutoff 02) goes to -oo), and so does the comparative statics effect of competence (cf. (7)). When A reaches zero and the normalized bias q reaches infinity, we have the limiting case of no communication (babbling is the unique equilibrium), where competence is irrelevant.
The second strategic effect of competence is the credibility of likely announcements. The more competent is CB, the more likely it is to observe a true 0 near its (zero) average. So, P can believe announcements by CB that are very far from the prior expectation (zero) only if they are made by a larger set of CB types, because such announcements are unlikely to be truthful. This implies that the equilibrium partition is coarser in the tails, and by the same token finer in the middle near zero, where the private signal o is likely to be from P's viewpoint. Again, this is all irrelevant if A = 0 and CB has no conflicting objectives. This discussion suggests that the effects of competence on credibility hold in any Bayesian communication game, provided that the sender has conflicting objectives and is uncertain about one of the two.
To establish formally the effects of changes in competence H on the equilibrium sequences { Ok}=0, K = 1, 2, ... N(q, H), we again use the normalization that collapses all parameters into the rescaled bias q. An increase in competence is equivalent to a decrease in q. We vary q and compute numerically all equilibria. We obtain the main result of this paper: Equilibria are Pareto ranked by the number of messages. So, even if the game always has multiple equilibria (at least babbling and twomessage, but usually more), it is natural to focus on the equilibrium with the finest partition of N(q) messages. A simple forward induction argument may be used to select this Pareto-dominant equilibrium. CB has to announce a message that can only be part of this best equilibrium. If P plays along, CB has indeed an incentive to announce that message, and P to believe it, so the announcement and the Pareto-dominant equilibrium are self-enforcing. Because in this equilibrium the number of elements and the associated "variance" measure of credibility are increasing in H, we conclude that competence implies credibility.
V. Numerical Examples
The numerical solution of the game allows us to prove Proposition 4 and to illustrate the comparative statics effects of changes in bias, competence, and conservatism on the extent of communication. For comparative statics purposes, for each parameter configuration, we focus on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium with the finest message space, which maximizes the scope for communication. We derive the results with the algorithm for the rescaled message space, but we present them in the original message space.
Since we normalized o,, = 1, we express quantities in percentage points. For example, we assume an average desired inflation rate e* = 2. This implies Pr(0 = rr* -2o- Second, for every value of the competence parameter H, the message distribution is skewed above its average value of 2. This is a consequence of the inflation bias, which makes announcements of low inflation incredible, even when CB truly observes a signal of low required inflation 0. CB cannot announce a very low inflation target because P would not believe it.
Third, as communication is unbiased on average, to compensate for skewness CB must be relatively likely to announce below-average inflation. In order to offset the perception of bias, CB, especially if not highly competent, must speak as a moderately conservative one most of the time. This result has been proven in general for the two-message equilibrium.
Fourth, as CB's competence H rises and the normalized bias/competence ratio q declines, the maximum number of messages that can be sent by CB to P in equilibrium rises from 2 to 6. 
VI. Extensions
We now discuss the robustness of our results to extensions and variations of the model.9 We show that, depending on the setup, competence either enhances or, in the least interesting cases, has no effect on credibility. We speculate on the circumstances under which the opposite result, that competence is detrimental to credibility, may emerge, although we could not find such an example, so this remains an open question. Our earlier discussion suggests that the basic intuition behind the result extends to all communication games where the sender has conflicting objectives represented by smooth payoff functions. where the second equality follows after replacing output y from (14) and solving the minimization problem. In this case, uncertainty over the natural rate of output o does not matter for equilibrium play: whatever potential output w happens to be, CB wants to overshoot it by a known b. To do so, CB sets a best response that depends only on P's expectations, not on CB's private information. This is a standard BarroGordon game. Competence plays no role, because CB does not care about learning the state o. Therefore, this specification is inappropriate to capture the idea that CB has private information that is relevant to its decisions.
In the second specification, CB does not know potential output and sets a target b for actual output:
7T ( HO -N(b, H) . Therefore, in this case the "competence parameter" H measures the uncertainty of P's beliefs about CB's inflation bias. If H = 0, then P knows exactly how biased CB is, and no residual uncertainty remains. In fact, no announcement can be believed. The higher H, the more uncertain is P about the motives for CB's announcements, and the more P pays attention. From here, the analysis proceeds as in the previous case, with the only (irrelevant) difference that the normalized bias is sq rather than q, and the message space has been reformulated accordingly. Our main results go through. In particular, competence implies credibility (Proposition 4). The intuition behind the main result also remains the same as in the baseline model. CB cares about surprising inflation expectations to stimulate output, but also about inflation per se, with weight A. In the baseline model, CB is not sure about the latter objective. In this version of the model, it is not sure about how expansionary a given inflation rate is, because output is also driven by a supply-side shock w. If CB did not care about inflation, A = 0, then the game would be a standard Barro-Gordon game with just one biased objective, with the only added twist that the bias is b -HO rather than b (cf. the best response inflation rate when A = 0). Since 0 has zero mean, P expects b -HO to be equal to b on average. From the point of view of P, this is exactly like the perfect information situation. This game has no equilibrium, as both expected inflation and actual inflation would be pushed to infinity (cf. (2.2) with A = 0). Whatever CB observes, on average P expects it to try to inflate the economy. Lack of CB's concerns for the costs of inflation leads to no equilibrium. Notice that the change of language is meaningful as long as A > 0. When inflation matters (A > 0) and its costs discipline monetary policy, then P can believe something of what CB says. But then the actual realization of private information 0 matters, and again competence H measures the weight that CB places on 0 in the output part of its objective. A very competent CB that observes a very high 0 thinks that the supply shock w is high and output needs no further monetary stimulus, so CB is less inclined to give in to temptation from the inflation b. Thus, its announcement of a low inflation rate is more credible than one made by an incompetent CB.
Two possible specifications of uncertainty remain, concerning the parameters A and s. Preferences for inflation A are plausibly CB's private information, but it is hard to think of reasons why a CB's governing body would be persistently uncertain about its own A. The degree of nominal rigidity s, instead, is a structural parameter of the model, and not a preference parameter of CB. Thus, it is reasonable to think that CB has some private view/signal about s, but is not certain about its value. However, unlike shocks to desired inflation and to the natural rate of output, it is plausible that s is slowly changing, and thus quickly learned by P. We do not pursue this possibility further, because our starting point is the competence of CB in evaluating fresh new information every period, the type of uncertainty that makes discretionary policy valuable in the first place. As the dynamic analysis developed later suggests, the competence of CB matters most when the state of nature that CB estimates is sufficiently variable over time to preserve asymmetry of information.
B. Alternative Specifications of Central Bank Competence and Preferences
So far, we have defined the "competence" of CB to be its ability to accurately read the state of the economy and to set the optimal policy target accordingly. Alternatively, we can think of "competence" as the ability to actually implement a chosen target. The current practice of monetary policy and statements by its practitioners suggests that, consistently with the view taken in this paper, CB's main concern is the former task, formulating the optimal policy, albeit considerable resources are also devoted to implement it correctly and effectively.
The quadratic loss function specification widely adopted in Barro-Gordon policy games, and often justified as a local Taylor approximation to a more general loss function, is important for the results. In particular, the marginal cost of deviating from truthtelling is initially negligible and increases slowly. Suppose instead that CB is very riskaverse concerning large deviations of inflation and output from a reasonable range: both deflation and excessive inflation have ominous consequences. For example, CB engages in "macro-risk management." If the acceptable range is common knowledge and CB privately formulates a target for inflation or output within that range, then our intuition will stand. An incompetent CB risks making big mistakes when trying to fine-tune the economy, so it cannot be trusted when announcing a target, especially near the boundaries of the range. A competent CB would be more comfortable taking such risks, so one would expect it to be more credible in those circumstances. If, instead, CB has private information only about the acceptable range for inflation and output, rather than about numerical values of the targets, then a less competent CB will be more conservative when trying to manipulate output, for fear of making the fatal big mistake. In this quite different scenario, competence is potentially detrimental to credibility, although it remains an open question whether other effects might be sufficiently strong to preserve the basic result.
C. Dynamics
What happens when the game is repeated over and over? Reputational effects from repeated play can sustain a host of equilibria and lessen incentive constraints in the presence of private information. As mentioned earlier, the kind of CB private information that we are interested in concerns shocks that are not too persistent, because those are the types of shocks that require flexibility to be addressed.
The literature on repeated games with evolving private information is thin. The closest reference is Athey, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2005), who study a repeated version of this monetary policy game. As already mentioned, in order to preclude any role for communication, they assume that states w are i.i.d. over time, and expectations are formed each period by P before CB privately observes the signal 0, which is equal to w; i.e., CB is perfectly competent. Through a dynamic mechanism design approach, they characterize the best equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game, which they implement via an optimal inflation cap: CB is prohibited from setting inflation above some optimal mandated level. Our analysis differs from theirs in two respects: we are interested in the role of communication, and we assume Therefore, the threat of grim trigger by P is less punishing for a more competent CB. This implies that a more competent CB's incentives are not obviously in favor of truth-telling. Finally, the one-shot gain from deviating for one period from truth-telling, when P believes whatever CB says, is given by the best possible lie. After choosing the optimal lie and plugging it back: minL(010) = s2A b s(+ A+)2 s2 +A -2bsHb sAH+ LT s2A s2 + A = LT b2 =D, which is independent of 0 and is also smaller than the flow loss in the truth-telling equilibrium, axT, by an amount independent of competence H. " We could also assume that P never observes 0. CB would never deviate by first telling a "lie" (a message not associated to the draw 0 in the prescribed equilibrium) and then choosing an inflation rate that is consistent with the lie. This announcement-action sequence would preserve equilibrium play in the future, because deeds would be matched to words and P would not detect the lie. But it would also increase the short-run loss relative to equilibrium play. In fact, CB would force itself to take the wrong action just to preserve credibility, and it can achieve this goal more cheaply by not lying and taking the appropriate monetary action (talk is cheap, inflation is not). Hence, we restrict attention to deviations from equilibrium announcements, followed by the static best inflation rate given P's expectations. This always allows P to detect lies, as if P truly observed the 0 realization. and Morris (1997) on cheap talk, while Morris (2001) focuses on the effects of a reputation for bias on cheap talk. Suppose that both CB's competence and its bias are private information. Therefore, CB's decision to commit or not to a rule (to resist proposed incentive schemes or delegation) may convey information about its competence and bias, and have an impact on P's expectations about policy and the credibility of announcements. CB's choice of a discretionary policy may be interpreted by P not as a sign of bias, or lack thereof, but rather as an expression of competence and of the value attributed to flexibility. Discretion is not necessarily punished by P with high inflationary expectations, as it usually is in the literature on time-inconsistent monetary policy, because CB has many motives to choose discretion.
In this light, the ECB's rigidity, relative to the Fed, can be due either to the need to convince the private sector that the ECB did not inherit the historical bias of the Bundesbank, or due to its "incompetence" relative to the formidable task that it faces. Conversely, the Fed's activism and ability to shape expectations through communication may be explained by the reputation for competence acquired during Greenspan's tenure, which resolves any doubts of inflationbiased discretionary policy.
F. Central Bank's Over/Underconfidence
Finally, relax the assumption of common prior beliefs. Suppose that CB believes it is more competent than P thinks it is. That is, CB is relatively overconfident in its own ability, and the two players agree to disagree on the key parameter H. As documented by an ample psychology literature, human beings have an almost innate tendency to overestimate their own ability. Clearly, CB's overconfidence has a beneficial effect on communication and welfare. The reason is that CB is benevolent, and its incentives to truthful communication depend on its perceived degree of competence. A confident CB is self-disciplined, even if it thinks that P incorrectly (in CB's view) disagrees with this assessment, it acts paternalistically, and it chooses a transparent approach. In turn, P believes CB because it knows that CB believes it is right. Conversely, suppose that competence is CB's private information, which is discovered by P over time from monetary policy performance. If CB gets lucky early on, then it enjoys what it knows to be an excessive reputation for competence, and becomes relatively underconfident. Nonetheless, due to the beneficial effects of (reputation for) competence on credibility, CB has no reason to reveal its incompetence. This result stands in contrast to that in Morris and Shin (2002) , where a benevolent policymaker who knows it possesses valuable but imprecise information would prefer not to announce it publicly. When both bias and the CNBC effect are present, CB would have to trade off the two effects in relaying to P its confidence in its own forecasts. gerates its announcements, making things even worse. This may be an equilibrium outcome of our game, without resorting to some form of bounded rationality in markets, only if CB's competence is its private information, so that it cares about its reputation for competence. Exploring this environment is a natural direction of future research.
VII. Conclusions
Another open question is under which circumstances, if any, the opposite result holds, namely, competence is detrimental to credibility. While this is an interesting possibility, Section VI shows that, within our class of monetary policy games, the beneficial effects of competence on credibility are robust. Indeed, in this respect, there is nothing special about central banking, and the analysis supports the same intuition in any communication game where the sender has conflicting objectives and is uncertain about the nonbiased part of his preferences. An important example is an electoral campaign, where each candidate has an ideological bias, but also a concern for setting a correct social policy. An extreme but very competent candidate may prevail over a centrist incompetent opponent. More concretely, consider a candidate for president, who is leading in the polls and has a known preference for strong employment protection, but believes that the economy in its current state cannot tolerate rigid labor markets. If he is perceived to be very competent on labor issues, he will be able to make a credible campaign promise to introduce no new employment protection. Otherwise, whatever he says, mass layoffs will occur when his election appears likely. But notice that for e = 8 = 0, the leftmost term is strictly larger than the rightmost term, so this inequality must be violated for some e, 6 small enough, and k > max(Ks, Ke), the desired contradiction.
Dynamic Analysis when (15) Fails.-When condition (15) fails, we can construct equilibria with partial communication, supported by the threat of grim trigger to "babbling forever" (flow loss axD) after P detects a lie by CB "outside the equilibrium" partition (message space).
First, we show that equilibria are again partitional also in this dynamic setting. Given any equilibrium, whether partitional or not, the associated payoff when observing 0 and announcing 0 is 
Ok -I
This double recursion allows us to construct all equilibria, similarly to the static case, and to verify the comparative statics effects of changes in H. For given parameter values, the best equilibrium's partition is finer than in the static case. Given the tail properties of the normal distribution, there always exists a two-message equilibrium.
